Governance of the European Banking Union's Single Resolution Mechanism

Posted: 6 Jul 2017

See all articles by Danny Busch

Danny Busch

Radboud University Nijmegen - Institute for Financial Law (IFR)

Date Written: July 5, 2017

Abstract

This article analyzes and discusses the governance or decision-making structure of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) within the European Banking Union, particularly with respect to financing of the Single Resolution Fund and adoption of resolution schemes. The governance structure of the SRM is undoubtedly complex. It is clearly a compromise, desperately trying to strike a balance between the interests of individual Member States within the Eurozone, the interests of the Eurozone or the EU as a whole, and, sometimes, the interests of Member States outside the Eurozone. Certain aspects of the complexity are however due to technical reasons of EU law, particularly the Meroni-doctrine. The SRM’s governance structure features several layers of complexity. The SRM’s complex governance structure may well have a negative impact on the effectiveness of decision-making within the SRM framework — efficient, impartial, decisive and quick decision-making is obviously crucial in the case of bank resolution.

Keywords: Single Resolution Mechanism, European Banking Union, bank resolution, Governance, Single Resolution Board, Meroni

JEL Classification: G21, G28, K23

Suggested Citation

Busch, Danny, Governance of the European Banking Union's Single Resolution Mechanism (July 5, 2017). European Banking Institute Working Paper Series 2017 - no. 9, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2997442 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2997442

Danny Busch (Contact Author)

Radboud University Nijmegen - Institute for Financial Law (IFR) ( email )

Nijmegen
Netherlands

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
925
PlumX Metrics