Syndication in Equity Crowdfunding: Performance and the Evaluation of Experts

34 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2017 Last revised: 22 Jan 2025

See all articles by Christian Catalini

Christian Catalini

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; Diem Association and Diem Networks US; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Xiang Hui

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 24, 2019

Abstract

We study investment syndication on an equity crowdfunding platform where experts (syndicate leads) curate and invest in early-stage firms on behalf of other investors in exchange for shared profit. We provide evidence that this model outperforms direct investments, especially for non-Californian startups with less publicly available information. Additional analyses suggest the better performance comes from reduced asymmetric information and lower transaction costs through better access to quality deals and lower effort for evaluating and monitoring startups. Using a large-scale field experiment, we find that investors are more likely to explore syndicate leads' profiles when provided information about their network size and favorable track record, suggesting that investors value these two attributes when evaluating leads. A survey of 44 active investors shows that large networks are perceived as signals of access to quality deals, reputation, and due diligence, while track record is perceived as a signal of leads' ability and a direct measure of success. These findings suggest that the syndication model can enhance market efficiency in equity crowdfunding and that emphasizing leads' professional networks and past performance can be an effective strategy for increasing adoption of the model.

Keywords: equity crowdfunding, angel investors, syndication, venture capital, entrepreneurship

JEL Classification: O31, L26, G24, L86, O33

Suggested Citation

Catalini, Christian and Hui, Xiang, Syndication in Equity Crowdfunding: Performance and the Evaluation of Experts (January 24, 2019). MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 5239-17, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2997710 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2997710

Christian Catalini (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

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Diem Association and Diem Networks US ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Xiang Hui

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )

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St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States

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