Guaranteeing Defined Contribution Pensions: The Option to Buy-Back a Defined Benefit Promise

26 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2002 Last revised: 27 Mar 2002

See all articles by Marie-Eve Lachance

Marie-Eve Lachance

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Olivia S. Mitchell

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2002

Abstract

After a long commitment to defined benefit (DB) pension plans for US public sect or employees, many state legislatures have introduced defined contribution (DC) plans for their public employees. In this process, investment risk which was previously borne by state DB plans has now devolved to employees covered by the new DC plans. In light of this trend, some states have proposed a guarantee mechanism to help protect DC plan participants. One such guarantee takes the form of an option permitting DC plan participants to bu y back their DB benefit for a price. This paper develops a theoretical framewor k to analyze the option design and illustrate how employee characteristics influ ence the option's cost. We illustrate the potential magnitude of a buy-back opt ion value enacted recently by the State of Florida for its public employees. If employees were to exercise the buy-back option optimally, the market value of t his option could represent up to 100 percent of the DC contributions over the wo rklife.

Suggested Citation

Lachance, Marie-Eve and Mitchell, Olivia S., Guaranteeing Defined Contribution Pensions: The Option to Buy-Back a Defined Benefit Promise (January 2002). NBER Working Paper No. w8731. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=299807

Marie-Eve Lachance

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Olivia S. Mitchell (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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