A Model of Smuggling and Trafficking of Illegal Immigrants with a Host Country Policy

15 Pages Posted: 7 Jul 2017

See all articles by Saibal Kar

Saibal Kar

Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta; Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Hamid Beladi

University of Texas at San Antonio - College of Business - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 2017

Abstract

This paper deals with illegal immigration via two distinct activities — smuggling and trafficking of workers. A destination-source model determines economic pay‐offs and a standard labor market policy works as a deterrent. Tax paid by legal unskilled workers at the destination is determined endogenously and it finances inland monitoring against illegal immigration, holding the border patrol at a given level. The tax also finances unemployment benefit to legal workers at the destination. The number of immigrant smugglers and traffickers is also determined endogenously along with employer penalty and market wage for illegal immigrants. Higher unemployment benefits may reduce illegal wages, raise traffickers’ rent and reduce flow of illegal immigrants from the source countries.

Suggested Citation

Kar, Saibal and Beladi, Hamid, A Model of Smuggling and Trafficking of Illegal Immigrants with a Host Country Policy (August 2017). Review of Development Economics, Vol. 21, Issue 3, pp. 698-712, 2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998420 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rode.12307

Saibal Kar (Contact Author)

Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta ( email )

R-1, Baishnabghata Patuli Township
Calcutta, 700 094
India
91-33-2462 7252 (Phone)
91-33-2462 6183 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cssscal.org

Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Hamid Beladi

University of Texas at San Antonio - College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

One UTSA Circle
P.O. Box 5636
San Antonio, TX 78249
United States
210-458-7038 (Phone)
210-458-7040 (Fax)

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