Caregivers in the Family: Daughters, Sons and Social Norms

32 Pages Posted: 10 Jul 2017

See all articles by Francesca Barigozzi

Francesca Barigozzi

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Helmuth Cremer

University of Toulouse (GREMAQ & IDEI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Kerstin Roeder

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU); University of Augsburg

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Abstract

Daughters are the principal caregivers of their dependent parents. In this paper, we study long-term care (LTC) choices by bargaining families with mixed- or same-gender siblings. LTC care can be provided either informally by children, or formally at home or in an institution. A social norm implies that daughters suffer a psychological cost when they provide less informal care than the average child. We show that the laissez-faire (LF) and the utilitarian first-best (FB) differ for two reasons. First, because informal care imposes a negative externality on daughters via the social norm, too much informal care is provided in LF. Second, the weights children and parents have in the family bargaining problem might differ in general from their weights in social welfare. We show that the FB allocation can be achieved through a system of subsidies on formal home and institutional care. Except when children and parents have equal bargaining weights these subsidies are gender-specific and reflect Pigouvian as well as "paternalistic" considerations.

Keywords: social norms, formal and informal LTC, daughters, sons

JEL Classification: D13, H23, H31, I19

Suggested Citation

Barigozzi, Francesca and Cremer, Helmuth and Roeder, Kerstin, Caregivers in the Family: Daughters, Sons and Social Norms. IZA Discussion Paper No. 10862, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998971

Francesca Barigozzi (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

P.zza Scaravilli 2
40126 Bologna, 40126
Italy

Helmuth Cremer

University of Toulouse (GREMAQ & IDEI) ( email )

Toulouse, 31000
France
+33 1 6112 8606 (Phone)
+33 1 6112 8637 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Kerstin Roeder

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) ( email )

Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
Munich, DE Bavaria 80539
Germany

University of Augsburg ( email )

Universitätsstr. 2
Augsburg, 86159
Germany

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