Labor Hoarding in Russia: Where Does it Come from?

34 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2002

See all articles by Rouslan Koumakhov

Rouslan Koumakhov

Université Paris X Nanterre

Boris Najman

CES- Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne; University Paris-Est Créteil (UPEC); CASE - Center for Social and Economic Research; World Bank - Governance Global Practice

Date Written: June 2000

Abstract

The paper focuses on the labor "hoarding" problem in Russia. We studied two forms of "hoarding": unpaid leaves and short-time work. Our research is based on the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) database. The paper exploits individual panel data between 1994 and 1996. We show that unpaid leaves and short-time work do not represent a form of hidden unemployment. Both types of labor "hoarding" reflect the nature of employees' professional competencies. First, unpaid leaves concern primarily the employees with firm-specific knowledge, while short-time work affects strongly unskilled workers. Second, external mobility is mostly related to young people and unskilled blue-collar workers while employees with specific competencies do not change jobs so much. The paper insists on significant internal adjustments which are taking place through unpaid leaves and short-time work. This explains why there has been no massive unemployment in Russia until now. In conclusion, Russian labor market is characterized rather by internal flexibility than by labor "hoarding".

Keywords: labor market, internal adjustments, flexibility, Russia, skills

JEL Classification: J2, C23, P23

Suggested Citation

Koumakhov, Rouslan and Najman, Boris, Labor Hoarding in Russia: Where Does it Come from? (June 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=299934 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.299934

Rouslan Koumakhov (Contact Author)

Université Paris X Nanterre ( email )

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92001 Nanterre Cedex
France
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Boris Najman

CES- Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

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Paris, IL
France
+331 44 07 81 95 (Phone)
+331 44 07 81 91 (Fax)

University Paris-Est Créteil (UPEC) ( email )

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CASE - Center for Social and Economic Research ( email )

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Poland

World Bank - Governance Global Practice ( email )

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Washington, DC 20433
United States

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