Searching for Contributions by Moonlight: Politically Connected Firms in Japan

29 Pages Posted: 17 Jul 2017

See all articles by Yusaku Horiuchi

Yusaku Horiuchi

Dartmouth College - Department of Government

Rieko Kage

University of Tokyo

Hiroto Katsumata

Gakushuin University

Date Written: July 10, 2017

Abstract

Why do politicians serve on the boards of private firms, and why do firms bring politicians onto their boards? We examine this question of "politically connected firms" by drawing on a new dataset of "moonlighting" activities by Japanese politicians. Specifically, we focus on incumbents who were serving on boards of corporations just before Japan's House of Representatives elections in 2009, 2012 and 2014 and show that winners of an election are more likely than losers to resign from their posts after the election but are typically reinstated when the next election is approaching. The results of analysis with various outcome variables and some additional evidence suggest the possibility that Japanese politicians leave corporate boards when they become nervous of becoming suspected of corruption but cannot resist the lure of corporate cash as the next election approaches.

Keywords: politically connected firms, moonlighting politicians, corruption, Japan

JEL Classification: D72, D73

Suggested Citation

Horiuchi, Yusaku and Kage, Rieko and Katsumata, Hiroto, Searching for Contributions by Moonlight: Politically Connected Firms in Japan (July 10, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2999555 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2999555

Yusaku Horiuchi (Contact Author)

Dartmouth College - Department of Government ( email )

204 Silsby Hall
HB 6108
Hanover, NH 03755
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.dartmouth.edu/horiuchi/

Rieko Kage

University of Tokyo ( email )

Hiroto Katsumata

Gakushuin University ( email )

1-5-1 Mejiro
Toshima-ku Tokyo 171-8588
United States

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