Sunrise, Sunset: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Dual-Class Stock Structures

62 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2017 Last revised: 22 Aug 2018

See all articles by Andrew Winden

Andrew Winden

Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University

Date Written: August 1, 2017

Abstract

A battle is brewing for control of America’s most dynamic companies. Entrepreneurs are increasingly seeking protection from interference or dismissal by public investors through the adoption of dual-class stock structures in initial public offerings. Institutional investors are pushing back, demanding that such structures be abandoned or strictly limited through sunset provisions. The actual terms of dual-class stock structures, however, have been remarkably understudied, so the debate between proponents of prohibition and private ordering is often ill-informed. This paper presents the first empirical analysis of the initial, or sunrise and terminal, or sunset provisions found in the charters of dual-class companies, with a data set of 123 U.S. public companies. Careful selection of such provisions can satisfy both the desire of entrepreneurs to pursue their idiosyncratic visions for value creation without fear of interference or dismissal and the need of investors for a voice to ensure management accountability. Private law firms representing entrepreneurs in initial public offerings play a critical role in the selection of charter provisions, so the onus is on such firms to ensure that private ordering produces a satisfactory resolution before momentum builds for a regulatory solution to investors’ concerns.

Keywords: Corporations, Dual-Class, Corporate Control, Controlling Shareholders, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, Sunset, Idiosyncratic Vision

JEL Classification: G32, G34, K22

Suggested Citation

Winden, Andrew, Sunrise, Sunset: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Dual-Class Stock Structures (August 1, 2017). Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 228. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3001574 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3001574

Andrew Winden (Contact Author)

Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University ( email )

Crown Quadrangle 559 Nathan Ab
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

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