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Delegation and Unbundling in a Crypto-Democracy

15 Pages Posted: 18 Jul 2017  

Chris Berg

RMIT University - School of Economics, Finance and Marketing

Date Written: July 13, 2017

Abstract

Representative democracy consists of a chain of delegation from voters to the executive and a corresponding chain of accountability, with some questions (particularly constitutional questions) reserved for popular vote. This structure reflects the high transaction costs of coordinating preferences among a large and diverse population, which has in part been determined by technological limitations. A new technology, blockchain, significantly reduces transaction costs. This technology turns out to have significant implications for democratic governance. In a crypto-democracy, voters have contractual relationships that allow them to unbundle, delegate, re-rebundle and reserve their voting power. Rather than planning our democratic structure and thus restricting opportunities for political exchange, the use of blockchain in a crypto-democracy allows us to ‘grow’ a democracy in a Hayekian framework.

Keywords: Crypto-Democracy, Blockchain, Transaction Costs, Institutional Economics, Democracy, Representative Government

JEL Classification: D02, D7, D72, P4

Suggested Citation

Berg, Chris, Delegation and Unbundling in a Crypto-Democracy (July 13, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3001585

Chris Berg (Contact Author)

RMIT University - School of Economics, Finance and Marketing ( email )

Level 12, 239 Bourke Street
Melbourne, Victoria 3000
Australia

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