Institutions and Political Party Systems: The Euro Case

28 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2017

See all articles by Jesús Fernández-Villaverde

Jesús Fernández-Villaverde

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Tano Santos

Columbia Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 3, 2017

Abstract

This paper argues that institutions and political party systems are simultaneously determined. A large change to the institutional framework, such as the creation of the euro by a group of European countries, will realign - after a transition period - the party system as well. The new political landscape may not be compatible with the institutions that triggered it. To illustrate this point, we study the case of the euro and how the party system has evolved in Southern and Northern European countries in response to it.

Keywords: Federalism, Political Institutions, Party Systems, Euro

JEL Classification: D72, F30, F40

Suggested Citation

Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús and Santos, Tano, Institutions and Political Party Systems: The Euro Case (July 3, 2017). PIER Working Paper No. 17-014, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 17-73, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3002023 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3002023

Jesús Fernández-Villaverde (Contact Author)

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Tano Santos

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