Common Ownership and Voluntary Disclosure

56 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2017 Last revised: 3 May 2019

See all articles by Andrea Pawliczek

Andrea Pawliczek

University of Missouri at Columbia - School of Accountancy

A. Nicole Skinner

University of Georgia - J.M. Tull School of Accounting

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 8, 2018

Abstract

Investors increasingly hold stock in multiple firms that compete in the same product market (“common ownership”). Taking market share from peers no longer maximizes shareholder value under common ownership, which incentivizes managers to implement less competitive strategies (Azar, 2016). Consistent with the existence of a negative relation between competition and disclosure, we predict and find that common ownership is positively associated with voluntary disclosure. We also show the result is diminished in industries for which there are direct communication channels, industries with low barriers to entry, industries facing high demand uncertainty, and industries containing dissimilar firms. Lastly, we examine an exogenous shock to common ownership to support our assertion that common ownership causes changes to disclosure behavior. Our paper contributes to the literature regarding the influence of shareholder preferences on disclosure, suggesting there are spillover effects from common ownership to other shareholders in the form of increased disclosure.

Keywords: Disclosure, common ownership, horizontal shareholding

JEL Classification: M41, D22, D43

Suggested Citation

Pawliczek, Andrea and Skinner, Ashley Nicole, Common Ownership and Voluntary Disclosure (June 8, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3002075 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3002075

Andrea Pawliczek

University of Missouri at Columbia - School of Accountancy ( email )

420 Cornell Hall
Columbia, MO 65211
United States

Ashley Nicole Skinner (Contact Author)

University of Georgia - J.M. Tull School of Accounting ( email )

Athens, GA 30602
United States

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