Discrimination and Nepotism: The Efficiency of the Anonymity Rule

37 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2002

See all articles by Chaim Fershtman

Chaim Fershtman

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Uri Gneezy

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management

Frank Verboven

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Department of Applied Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: January 2002

Abstract

The Paper considers two categories of discrimination: 'discrimination against' and 'discrimination in favour', which Becker coins 'nepotism'. The Paper develops an experimental test to distinguish between these two types of discrimination. The experiment compares the behaviour towards individuals of different groups with the behaviour towards anonymous individuals (those having no clear group affiliation). We illustrate the two attitudes by considering two segmented societies: Belgian society, with its linguistic segmentation between the Flemish and the Walloons, and Israeli society, where we focus on religious versus secular segmentation. In Belgium, we find evidence of discrimination against. Both the Walloons and the Flemish treat people of their own group in the same way as anonymous individuals while discriminating against individuals of the other group. In contrast, the behaviour of ultra orthodox religious Jews in Israel can be categorized as nepotism: they favour members of their own group while treating anonymous individuals in the same way as secular individuals. The distinction between the different types of discrimination is important in evaluating the effectiveness and the efficiency consequences of anti-discriminatory legislations.

Keywords: Discrimination, nepotism, efficiency, anonymity

JEL Classification: D00

Suggested Citation

Fershtman, Chaim and Gneezy, Uri and Verboven, Frank, Discrimination and Nepotism: The Efficiency of the Anonymity Rule (January 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=300454

Chaim Fershtman (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
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Israel
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+972 3 640 9908 (Fax)

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

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Netherlands

Uri Gneezy

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Rady School of Management
La Jolla, CA 92093
United States

Frank Verboven

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Department of Applied Economics ( email )

Leuven, B-3000
Belgium
+32 1 632 6944 (Phone)
+32 1 632 6732 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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