Chartering Super-Special Banks: Firm Formation and the Federal Reserve Act

11 Pages Posted: 21 Jul 2017

See all articles by Jason Briggeman

Jason Briggeman

Austin Community College - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 20, 2012

Abstract

There is not an overwhelming case to be made that the Federal Reserve System (FRS) should be analyzed as a bureau instead of as a firm or set of firms. Accordingly, I discuss the formation of the FRS in relation to the framework developed by William Gartner for describing the phenomenon of new venture creation. This framework illuminates the role played in the passage of the Federal Reserve Act by non-politician planners, some of whom knew well that they were destined to hold desirable positions within the incipient FRS. The role of such planners is not well illuminated by the conventional public choice framework, in which politicians are viewed as more or less acting alone in directing the formation of bureaus to enforce the parameters demanded by voters.

Keywords: bureaucracy, central banking, National Banking System, political entrepreneurship

JEL Classification: B52, D73, E58, L32, M13, N21

Suggested Citation

Briggeman, Jason, Chartering Super-Special Banks: Firm Formation and the Federal Reserve Act (November 20, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3005052 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3005052

Jason Briggeman (Contact Author)

Austin Community College - Department of Economics ( email )

5930 Middle Fiskville Road
Austin, TX 78752
United States

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