A Novel Look at Antitrust Analysis in Health Insurance Markets

Competition Policy International, 2017

Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2017-51

7 Pages Posted: 25 Jul 2017

See all articles by Barak D. Richman

Barak D. Richman

Duke University, School of Law

Kevin A. Schulman

Duke University - Medical Center

Date Written: July 17, 2017

Abstract

By their nature, the recent antitrust cases scrutinizing the two proposed health insurance mega-mergers -- Anthem with Cigna and Aetna with Humana -- focused on narrow definitions of specific markets and the likely static impact on prices. But the antitrust proceedings omitted a broader discussion of the forces acting on the health care market that brought these proposals forward. In this paper, we examine the structure of health care markets, scrutinize some specific questions about the antitrust analyses in these cases, explore alternative theories of antitrust regulation, and conclude with a new antitrust model to consider market dynamism in health insurance markets.

Keywords: health insurance mergers, architectural innovation, antitrust policy

JEL Classification: I13, L40, O38

Suggested Citation

Richman, Barak D. and Schulman, Kevin A., A Novel Look at Antitrust Analysis in Health Insurance Markets (July 17, 2017). Competition Policy International, 2017, Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2017-51, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3005661

Barak D. Richman (Contact Author)

Duke University, School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7244 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)

Kevin A. Schulman

Duke University - Medical Center ( email )

100 Fuqua Drive
Durham, NC 27715
United States

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