Some Reflections on the Proposed Revisions to the OECD Model and Commentaries, and on the Multilateral Instrument, with Respect to Fiscally Transparent Entities

British Tax Review, Vol. 2017, No. 3, pp. 295-373, 2017

Bulletin for International Taxation, Part 1, Vol. 71, No. 9, pp. 475-503, 2017

Bulletin for International Taxation, Part 2, Vol. 71, No. 10, pp. 553-567, 2017

Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 17/59

81 Pages Posted: 20 Jul 2017 Last revised: 31 Oct 2017

See all articles by Angelo Nikolakakis

Angelo Nikolakakis

Ernst & Young

Stephane Austry

CMS Bureau Francis Lefebvre

John Avery Jones

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - London School of Economics

Philip Baker

Field Court Tax Chambers

Peter Blessing

KPMG Washington National Tax Practice

Robert Danon

University of Lausanne

Shefali Goradia

BMR Advisors

Johann Hattingh

University of Cape Town (UCT) - Faculty of Law

Koichi Inoue

Jones Day - Tokyo Office

Jürgen Lüdicke

PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP - PricewaterhouseCoopers GmbH

Guglielmo Maisto

Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan - Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Piacenza

Toshio Miyatake

Adachi Henderson Miyatake & Fujita

Kees van Raad

Leiden University

Richard J. Vann

The University of Sydney Law School

Bertil Wiman

Uppsala University

Date Written: July 19, 2017

Abstract

This material was first published by Sweet & Maxwell Limited in Angelo Nikolakakis, Stephane Austry, John Avery Jones, Philip Baker, Peter Blessing, Robert Danon, Shefali Goradia, Johann Hattingh, Koichi Inoue, Juergen Luedicke, Guglielmo Maisto, Toshio Miyatake, Kees van Raad, Richard Vann and Bertil Wiman, “Some Reflections on the Proposed Revisions to the OECD Model and Commentaries, and on the Multilateral Instrument, With Respect to Fiscally Transparent Entities”, British Tax Review, Vol. 2017, No. 3, pp. 295-373, 2017 and is reproduced by agreement with the Publishers.

This article sets out some reflections of the authors on those aspects of the OECD’s October 2015 final report on Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements (the Hybrids Report) that relate to revisions to the OECD Model to add a specific provision on fiscally transparent entities (as a new Article 1(2)), and to build on the Commentaries already in place in this regard (the HR Proposals). It also considers the similar and related provisions contained in the multilateral instrument to implement the tax treaty related BEPS measures (the MLI) that was released on 24 November 2016. The authors conduct an extensive review of the issues and raise a number of interpretive and technical questions, as well as policy considerations. This review is set against the backdrop of an examination of similar provisions (or provisions with similar purposes) in the US Models and in various existing bilateral treaties, as well as under domestic laws, of the countries represented by the authors. The authors also provide some observations with respect to potential scope and drafting or implementation of alternatives, with a view to contributing to the ongoing international debate and reform project.

Keywords: International tax, tax treaties, BEPS, fiscally transparent entities

JEL Classification: K10, K30, K34

Suggested Citation

Nikolakakis, Angelo and Austry, Stephane and Avery Jones, John and Baker, Philip and Blessing, Peter and Danon, Robert and Goradia, Shefali and Hattingh, Johann and Inoue, Koichi and Lüdicke, Jürgen and Maisto, Guglielmo and Miyatake, Toshio and van Raad, Kees and Vann, Richard J. and Wiman, Bertil, Some Reflections on the Proposed Revisions to the OECD Model and Commentaries, and on the Multilateral Instrument, with Respect to Fiscally Transparent Entities (July 19, 2017). British Tax Review, Vol. 2017, No. 3, pp. 295-373, 2017; Bulletin for International Taxation, Part 2, Vol. 71, No. 10, pp. 553-567, 2017; Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 17/59. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3005860

Angelo Nikolakakis

Ernst & Young ( email )

P.O. Box 4500
Station B
Montreal, Quebec H3B 5J3
Canada

Stephane Austry

CMS Bureau Francis Lefebvre ( email )

2 rue Ancelle
92522 Neuilly-sur-Seine Cedex
Paris
France

John Avery Jones

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - London School of Economics ( email )

United Kingdom

Philip Baker

Field Court Tax Chambers ( email )

3 Field Court
Gray's Inn
London, WC1R 5EP
United Kingdom

Peter Blessing

KPMG Washington National Tax Practice ( email )

1801 K Street NW
Ste 12000
Washington, DC 20006
United States

Robert Danon

University of Lausanne ( email )

Quartier Chambronne
Lausanne, Vaud CH-1015
Switzerland

Shefali Goradia

BMR Advisors ( email )

BMR House
36B Dr. RK Shirodkar Marg
Parel Mumbai, 400012
India

Johann Hattingh

University of Cape Town (UCT) - Faculty of Law ( email )

Private Bag
Rondebosch 7701
South Africa

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.uct.ac.za/aprof-johann-hattingh

Koichi Inoue

Jones Day - Tokyo Office ( email )

Kamiyacho Prime Place
1-17, Toranomon 4-chome
Minato-ku, Tokyo, 105-0001
Japan

Jürgen Lüdicke

PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP - PricewaterhouseCoopers GmbH ( email )

Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaf
Alsterufer 1
Hamburg, D-20354
Germany

Guglielmo Maisto

Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan - Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Piacenza ( email )

Via Emilia Parmense, 84
Piacenza
Italy

Toshio Miyatake

Adachi Henderson Miyatake & Fujita ( email )

Kojimachi HF Building, 3rd Floor
3-2-4, Kojimachi, Chiyoda-ku
Tokyo, 102-0083
Japan

Kees Van Raad

Leiden University ( email )

Postbus 9500
Leiden, Zuid Holland 2300 RA
Netherlands

Richard J. Vann (Contact Author)

The University of Sydney Law School ( email )

Faculty of Law Building, F10
The University of Sydney
Camperdown, NSW 2006
Australia
+61 2 9351 0206 (Phone)
+ 61 2 9351 0200 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/about/staff/RichardVann/index.shtml

Bertil Wiman

Uppsala University ( email )

Box 513
Uppsala, 751 20
Sweden

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