Games with Graph Restricted Communication and Levels Structure of Cooperation

UB Economics Working Papers E17/363

28 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2017

See all articles by Oriol Tejada

Oriol Tejada

ETH Zürich - CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich

Mikel Alvarez-Mozos

University of Barcelona - Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics

Date Written: July 12, 2017

Abstract

We analyze surplus allocation problems where cooperation between agents is restricted both by a communication graph and by a sequence of embedded partitions of the agent set. For this type of problem, we define and characterize two new values extending the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value respectively. Our results enable the axiomatic comparison between the two values and provide some basic insights for the analysis of fair resource allocation in nowadays fully integrated societies.

Keywords: Coalitional games, Restricted cooperation, Graph restricted communication, Levels structure, Shapley value, Banzhaf value

JEL Classification: C7

Suggested Citation

Tejada, Oriol and Alvarez-Mozos, Mikel, Games with Graph Restricted Communication and Levels Structure of Cooperation (July 12, 2017). UB Economics Working Papers E17/363. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3005891 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3005891

Oriol Tejada (Contact Author)

ETH Zürich - CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich ( email )

Zürichbergstrasse 18
Zurich, 8092
Switzerland
41446329693 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cer.ethz.ch/mip/people/toriol

Mikel Alvarez-Mozos

University of Barcelona - Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics ( email )

Avda. Diagonal 690
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

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