The Performance Effect of Feedback Frequency and Detail: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Customer Satisfaction

53 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2017 Last revised: 3 Aug 2017

See all articles by Pablo Casas-Arce

Pablo Casas-Arce

Arizona State University (ASU) - W.P. Carey School of Business

Sofia M. Lourenço

ISEG Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Universidade de Lisboa; ADVANCE, CSG Research Center

Francisco de Asis Martinez-Jerez

University of Notre Dame - Department of Accountancy

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2, 2017

Abstract

This paper presents the results from a field experiment that examines the effects of non-financial performance feedback on the behavior of professionals working for an insurance repair company. We vary the frequency (weekly and monthly) and the level of detail of the feedback that the 800 professionals receive. Contrary to what we would expect if these professionals conformed to the model of the Bayesian decision maker, more (and more frequent) information does not always help improve performance. In fact, we find that professionals achieve the best outcomes when they receive detailed but infrequent (monthly) feedback. The treatment groups with frequent feedback, regardless of how detailed it is, perform no better than the control group (with monthly and aggregate information). The results are consistent with the information in the latest feedback report being most salient, and professionals in the weekly treatments overweighting their most recent performance, hampering their ability to learn.

Keywords: feedback, performance, customer satisfaction, field experiment, incentives, salience

JEL Classification: C93, D81, D91, J01, M40, M41, M52, M54, M55

Suggested Citation

Casas-Arce, Pablo and Lourenço, Sofia M. and Martinez-Jerez, Francisco de Asis, The Performance Effect of Feedback Frequency and Detail: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Customer Satisfaction (August 2, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3005990 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3005990

Pablo Casas-Arce

Arizona State University (ASU) - W.P. Carey School of Business ( email )

Tempe, AZ 85287-3706
United States

Sofia M. Lourenço

ISEG Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Universidade de Lisboa ( email )

Rua Miguel Lupi, 20
Lisbon, 1249-078
Portugal

ADVANCE, CSG Research Center ( email )

Rua Miguel Lupi, 20
Lisbon, 1249-078
Portugal

Francisco de Asis Martinez-Jerez (Contact Author)

University of Notre Dame - Department of Accountancy ( email )

Mendoza College of Business
Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646
United States

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