Perceived Income, Promotion and Incentive Effects

21 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2002

See all articles by Gil S. Epstein

Gil S. Epstein

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration

Melanie E. Ward-Warmedinger

European Central Bank (ECB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: February 2002

Abstract

This paper examines the disincentive effects of perceived underpayment on individuals' exerted effort and promotion. To this end we develop a theoretical framework and obtain empirical evidence by analyzing British academia data. We find that, tenured academics will tend to invest less effort in publishing as the difference between their perceived deserved income and actual income increases. On the other hand, for non-tenured academics this relationship is ambiguous. Our model predicts that if, however, tenured staff also derive utility directly from publication, over and above that associated with income and promotion, the difference between perceived and actual income has a smaller negative effect on the actual effort invested in research.

Keywords: Perceived Income, Underpayment, Productivity, Promotion

JEL Classification: J3, J4

Suggested Citation

Epstein, Gil S. and Ward-Warmedinger, Melanie E., Perceived Income, Promotion and Incentive Effects (February 2002). IZA Discussion Paper No. 435. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=300652

Gil S. Epstein (Contact Author)

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
+972 3 531 8937 (Phone)
+972 3 535 3180 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~epsteig/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration ( email )

Drayton House
30 Gordon Street
London, WC1H 0AX
United Kingdom

Melanie E. Ward-Warmedinger

European Central Bank (ECB) ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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