Does Divorce Law Matter?

37 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2002

See all articles by Giulio Fella

Giulio Fella

Queen Mary, University of London

Paola Manzini

University of St. Andrews - School of Economics and Finance; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Marco Mariotti

University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 2002

Abstract

In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be responsible for increasing divorce rates.

Keywords: Bargaining, Divorce, Non Transferability

JEL Classification: C78, J120

Suggested Citation

Fella, Giulio and Manzini, Paola and Mariotti, Marco, Does Divorce Law Matter? (February 2002). IZA Discussion Paper No. 439. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=300659

Giulio Fella

Queen Mary, University of London ( email )

Mile End Road
London E1 4NS, London E1 4NS
United Kingdom

Paola Manzini (Contact Author)

University of St. Andrews - School of Economics and Finance ( email )

North St
Saint Andrews, Fife KY16 9AJ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~pm210/

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Marco Mariotti

University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

Streatham Court
Rennes Drive
Exeter EX4 4RJ
United Kingdom
+01392 263219 (Phone)
+01392 263242 (Fax)

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