Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence

Posted: 26 Jul 2017

See all articles by Michalis Drouvelis

Michalis Drouvelis

University of Birmingham - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute

Alejandro Saporiti

University of Manchester

Nicolaas J. Vriend

Queen Mary, University of London - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 14, 2012

Abstract

We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well known median voter result and the two-sided policy differentiation outcome, the paper uncovers the existence of two new equilibrium configurations, called ‘one-sided’ and ‘probabilistic’ policy differentiation, respectively. Our analysis shows how these equilibrium configurations depend on the relative interests in power (resp., ideology) and the uncertainty about votersʼ preferences. The theoretical predictions are supported by the data collected from a laboratory experiment, as we observe convergence to the Nash equilibrium values at the aggregate as well as at the individual levels in all treatments, and the comparative statics effects across treatments are as predicted by the theory.

Keywords: Electoral competition; Power; Ideology; Electoral uncertainty; Nash equilibrium; Experimental evidence

JEL Classification: C72; C90; D72

Suggested Citation

Drouvelis, Michalis and Saporiti, Alejandro and Vriend, Nicolaas J., Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence (March 14, 2012). Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 83, 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3007328

Michalis Drouvelis

University of Birmingham - Department of Economics ( email )

Economics Department
Birmingham, B15 2TT
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/michalisdrouvelis/

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany

Alejandro Saporiti (Contact Author)

University of Manchester ( email )

Oxford Road
Manchester, M13 9PL
United Kingdom

Nicolaas J. Vriend

Queen Mary, University of London - Department of Economics ( email )

Mile End Road
London, E1 4NS
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 7882 5096 (Phone)
+44 (0)20 8983-3580 (Fax)

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
102
PlumX Metrics