Competitive Screening and Information Transmission

38 Pages Posted: 28 Jul 2017 Last revised: 5 Aug 2018

See all articles by Inácio Bó

Inácio Bó

WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Chiu Yu Ko

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 1, 2018

Abstract

Abstract We study competitive screening for high-ability students first between schools and then between colleges. By observing applicants' schools, colleges use information generated by schools' screening. Students with competing offers accept the most preferred one, increasing the screening costs of unpopular schools. When preferences between schools are more heterogeneous, school screens more, increasing the number of students with multiple offers. While this leads to schools and colleges attracting more high-ability students, fewer students attend their preferred schools. Students' ability to obtain better matches among colleges by strategically choosing which school to attend is fairly limited.

Keywords: Information transmission, College Admissions, Screening, Rankings

JEL Classification: C78, D61, D83

Suggested Citation

Bó, Inácio and Ko, Chiu Yu, Competitive Screening and Information Transmission (August 1, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009140 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3009140

Inácio Bó (Contact Author)

WZB Berlin Social Science Center ( email )

Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785 Berlin, 10785
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.inaciobo.com

Chiu Yu Ko

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics ( email )

1 Arts Link, AS2 #06-02
Singapore 117570, Singapore 119077
Singapore

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/kochiuyu/

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