Contingent Fee Litigation in New York City

23 Pages Posted: 28 Jul 2017 Last revised: 30 Nov 2017

See all articles by Eric Helland

Eric Helland

Claremont McKenna College - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance; RAND

Daniel M. Klerman

University of Southern California Gould School of Law

Brendan Dowling

USC Gould School of Law

Alexander Kappner

Independent

Date Written: November 29, 2017

Abstract

Since 1957, New York courts have required contingent fee lawyers to file “closing statements” that disclose settlement amounts, lawyers’ fees, an accounting of expenses, and other information. This article provides preliminary analysis of these data for the period 2004-2013. Among this article’s findings are that settlement rates in New York state courts are very high (84%) relative to previous studies, that very few cases are resolved by dispositive motions, that litigated cases and settled cases have almost exactly the same average recovery, that median litigation expenses, other than attorney’s fees, are 3% of gross recovery, that claims are disproportionately from poor neighborhoods, and that attorneys’ fees are almost always one third of net recovery, which is the maximum allowed by law.

Keywords: Tort, Contingent Fee, Litigation, Settlement, Selection, State Court, Expenses, Attorneys' Fees

Suggested Citation

Helland, Eric A. and Klerman, Daniel M. and Dowling, Brendan and Kappner, Alexander, Contingent Fee Litigation in New York City (November 29, 2017). 70 Vanderbilt Law Review 1971 (2017), Claremont McKenna College Robert Day School of Economics and Finance Research Paper No. 3009453, USC CLASS Research Papers Series No. CLASS17-19, USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 17-17, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009453

Eric A. Helland (Contact Author)

Claremont McKenna College - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance ( email )

500 E. Ninth St.
Claremont, CA 91711-6420
United States
909-607-7275 (Phone)
909-621-8243 (Fax)

RAND ( email )

1776 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA
United States

Daniel M. Klerman

University of Southern California Gould School of Law ( email )

699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-7973 (Phone)
213-740-5502 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://weblaw.usc.edu/contact/contactInfo.cfm?detailID=227

Brendan Dowling

USC Gould School of Law ( email )

699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

Alexander Kappner

Independent ( email )

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
476
Abstract Views
2,960
Rank
116,728
PlumX Metrics