Delegating Procedure

83 Pages Posted: 31 Jul 2017 Last revised: 25 Jun 2018

See all articles by Matthew A. Shapiro

Matthew A. Shapiro

Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Date Written: May 14, 2018

Abstract

The rise of arbitration has been one of the most significant developments in civil justice. Many scholars have criticized arbitration for, among other things, “privatizing” or “delegating” the state’s dispute-resolution powers and allowing private parties to abuse those powers with virtual impunity. An implicit assumption underlying this critique is that civil procedure, in contrast to arbitration, does not delegate significant state power to private parties.

This Article challenges that assumption and argues that we can address many of the concerns about arbitration by drawing on civil procedure’s solutions to its own delegation problem. From summonses to subpoenas to settlements, civil procedure pervasively delegates state power during ordinary civil litigation. With these delegations comes the potential for abuse. But rather than limit private parties’ access to delegated power before any abuse has occurred, civil procedure generally polices its delegations for abuse after the fact. It does so in three main ways: by rescinding delegated power, as in the appointment of discovery masters; by withholding enforcement from an exercise of delegated power, as in civil Batson; and by punishing abuse of delegated power, as in Rule 11 sanctions. Civil procedure’s delegation-policing doctrines allow the state not only to protect private parties from harm but also to avoid becoming complicit in private exercises of delegated power that offend important public values.

Arbitration’s delegations of state power present many of the same problems as civil procedure’s, and scholars have rightly criticized the current arbitration regime for essentially writing a blank check to private parties. But whereas most scholars have focused on restricting access to arbitration’s delegations by deeming broad categories of arbitration clauses unenforceable, this Article suggests adapting civil procedure’s delegation-policing doctrines for arbitration. Even if courts continue to enforce arbitration clauses more often than arbitration’s critics would prefer, they should police arbitration’s delegations more closely than the law now permits.

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Arbitration, ADR, Delegation, Law & Political Theory

JEL Classification: K12, K19, K39, K40, K41, K49

Suggested Citation

Shapiro, Matthew A., Delegating Procedure (May 14, 2018). Columbia Law Review, Vol. 118, No. 4, pp. 983-1065, 2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009792

Matthew A. Shapiro (Contact Author)

Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University ( email )

121 Hofstra University
Hempstead, NY 11549
United States
(516) 463-4119 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://law.hofstra.edu/directory/faculty/fulltime/shapiro/index.html

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