Killing in the Slums: Social Order, Criminal Governance, and Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro

American Political Science Review , Volume 114 , Issue 2 , May 2020 , pp. 552 - 572 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000856

51 Pages Posted: 31 Jul 2017 Last revised: 4 Jan 2021

See all articles by Beatriz Magaloni

Beatriz Magaloni

Stanford University - Department of Political Science

Edgar Franco-Vivanco

University of Michigan; University of Michigan

Vanessa Melo

Stanford University - Center for Latin American Studies

Date Written: November 19, 2018

Abstract

State interventions against organized criminal groups (OCGs) sometimes work to improve security, but often exacerbate violence. To understand why, this article offers a theory about criminal governance in five types of criminal regimes—Insurgent, Bandit, Symbiotic, Predatory, and Split. These differ according to whether criminal groups confront or collude with state actors, abuse or cooperate with the community, and hold a monopoly or contest territory with rival OCGs. Police interventions in these criminal regimes pose different challenges and are associated with markedly different local security outcomes. We provide evidence of this theory by using a multimethod research design combining quasi-experimental statistical analyses, automated text analysis, extensive qualitative research, and a large-N survey in the context of Rio de Janeiro’s “Pacifying Police Units” (UPPs), which sought to reclaim control of the favelas from criminal organizations.

Keywords: Criminal violence, Criminal governance, Policing, Brazil, Latin America

Suggested Citation

Magaloni, Beatriz and Franco Vivanco, Edgar and Melo, Vanessa, Killing in the Slums: Social Order, Criminal Governance, and Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro (November 19, 2018). American Political Science Review , Volume 114 , Issue 2 , May 2020 , pp. 552 - 572 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000856, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3010013 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3010013

Beatriz Magaloni

Stanford University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650-724-7481 (Phone)

Edgar Franco Vivanco (Contact Author)

University of Michigan ( email )

610 E. University Avenue
3338 School of Education,
Ann Arbor, MI Michigan 48109
United States
48109 (Fax)

University of Michigan ( email )

Ann Arbor, MI
United States

Vanessa Melo

Stanford University - Center for Latin American Studies

Bolivar House 582 Alvarado Row
Stanford, CA 94305
United States

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