Dworkin, Fuller and the Apostle Paul: Rules, Principles and Legalistic Antinomianism

Abstract

How should law be viewed in right relationship with its normative aims? More specifically, how does this relate to its function and purpose? The Apostle Paul faced a similar struggle. In response, he makes the extraordinary appeal to return to the principles behind the Mosaic Law. Under contemporary jurisprudence, positivism views law as a system of rules. This article argues law just as much consists of principles. By drawing upon the jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin and Lon Fuller, I first set out law’s governance function within a dichotomy consisting of rules of duty and principles of aspiration. I then examine two related themes in Pauline critique of the law, viz. excessive legalism (the love of law) and heteronomous autonomy (the love in law). I argue that law’s governance necessitates substantive morality in addition to procedural legality, institutional formality alongside reciprocal commitment, interactional expectancy balanced with an aspirational scope. Insofar as the realisation of law is premised upon its rules, it is submitted here that its fulfilment lies within principles.

Keywords: Rule of Law, Pauline Jurisprudence, Rules, Principles