The Role of Unaffiliated Bankers on Conditional Conservatism: Evidence from IFRS Information Shock

28 Pages Posted: 3 Aug 2017

See all articles by Pietro Bonetti

Pietro Bonetti

University of Navarra, IESE Business School

Elisabetta Ipino

Concordia University, Quebec - Department of Accountancy

Antonio Parbonetti

University of Padua

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July/August 2017

Abstract

We exploit IFRS mandatory adoption as a source of variation in the demand for conditional conservatism to examine the role of unaffiliated bankers on the level of conditional conservatism. We show that firms with unaffiliated bankers on boards of directors experience a significant increase in the level of conditional conservatism compared with firms without unaffiliated bankers on boards. These findings hold after we account for other country‐level factors that shape the demand for conditional conservatism. Additional analyses show that the role of unaffiliated bankers on conditional conservatism depends also on firm‐specific incentives arising from the contracting environment. Taken together, our findings provide new insights into the role of corporate governance arrangements on financial reporting outcomes.

Keywords: accounting conservatism, accounting regulation, corporate governance

Suggested Citation

Bonetti, Pietro and Ipino, Elisabetta and Parbonetti, Antonio, The Role of Unaffiliated Bankers on Conditional Conservatism: Evidence from IFRS Information Shock (July/August 2017). Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 44, Issue 7-8, pp. 925-952, 2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3012791 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12252

Pietro Bonetti (Contact Author)

University of Navarra, IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Elisabetta Ipino

Concordia University, Quebec - Department of Accountancy ( email )

Montreal, Quebec H3G 1M8
Canada

Antonio Parbonetti

University of Padua ( email )

Via del Santo 33
Padova, 35123
Italy
+39 049 8274261 (Phone)

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