Does Equity-Based Managerial Compensation Increase Shareholder Value in Weak Institutional Environments? Evidence from China

55 Pages Posted: 5 Aug 2017 Last revised: 2 Aug 2019

See all articles by Yanyan Chen

Yanyan Chen

South China Agriculture University

Bin Ke

National University of Singapore

Na Liu

The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen

Date Written: August 1, 2019

Abstract

We examine whether allowing publicly listed firms to adopt equity-based compensation increases shareholder value for firms domiciled in weak institutional environments. We test our idea using a series of regulations in China that allowed publicly listed Chinese firms to adopt equity-based compensation for the first time. Consistent with prior research, we find that shareholder value did increase for the firms that adopted equity-based compensation schemes. However, we find that only 16% of the publicly listed Chinese firms adopted equity-based compensation schemes seven years following the passage of the first regulation. We find little evidence that the stock market reactions to the events associated with the passage of the regulations were significant for the entire stock market portfolio or the sub-portfolios of SOEs and non-SOEs. Overall, our results support Core et al.’s (2003) conjecture that the efficacy of equity-based compensation hinges on a country’s institutional environment quality.

Keywords: equity-based compensation; institutional environment quality; China

JEL Classification: J33; K22; N25

Suggested Citation

Chen, Yanyan and Ke, Bin and Liu, Na, Does Equity-Based Managerial Compensation Increase Shareholder Value in Weak Institutional Environments? Evidence from China (August 1, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3013016 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3013016

Yanyan Chen

South China Agriculture University ( email )

Guangzhou
China

Bin Ke

National University of Singapore ( email )

Mochtar Riady Building, BIZ 1, #07-53
15 Kent Ridge Drive
Singapore, 119245
Singapore
+6566013133 (Phone)

Na Liu (Contact Author)

The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen ( email )

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