Auctions with Endogenous Initiation
59 Pages Posted: 7 Aug 2017 Last revised: 30 Aug 2022
Date Written: August 30, 2022
We study initiation of takeover auctions by potential buyers and the seller. A bidder's indication of interest reveals that she is optimistic about the target. If bidders' values have a substantial common component, as in takeover battles between financial bidders, this effect disincentivizes bidders from indicating interest, and auctions are seller-initiated. Conversely, in private-value auctions, such as battles between strategic bidders, equilibria can feature both seller- and bidder-initiated auctions, with the likelihood of the latter decreasing in commonality of values and the probability of a forced sale by the seller. We also relate initiation to bids and auction outcomes.
Keywords: auctions of companies, auction design, mergers and acquisitions
JEL Classification: D44, G34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation