Managerial Self-Interest and Strategic Repurchases: Evidence from Equity Vesting Schedules

49 Pages Posted: 8 Aug 2017 Last revised: 14 Jul 2018

David Moore

University of Kentucky, Gatton College of Business and Economics

Date Written: June 29, 2018

Abstract

This paper studies the strategic use and timing of share repurchases by insiders for personal gain. Using grant level compensation data and a hand-collected sample of monthly repurchases, I find a positive relation between CEO equity sales and share repurchases. I identify the relation using the vesting schedule of equity grants as an instrument for equity sales. This behavior is stronger when the CEO is chairman of the board but otherwise is persistent across firm characteristics. However, these repurchases do not appear to destroy shareholder value. The results indicate managerial self-interest and CEO contracts motivate a subset of share repurchases.

Keywords: Share repurchase; share buyback; payout policy; option and stock grants; equity vesting; CEO incentives; managerial self interest

JEL Classification: G14, G30, G35, M12

Suggested Citation

Moore, David, Managerial Self-Interest and Strategic Repurchases: Evidence from Equity Vesting Schedules (June 29, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3014462 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3014462

David Moore (Contact Author)

University of Kentucky, Gatton College of Business and Economics ( email )

Lexington, KY
United States

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