Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Insider Tainting: Strategic Tipping of Material Non-Public Information

62 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 2017 Last revised: 15 Nov 2017

Andrew Verstein

Wake Forest University School of Law; University of Chicago Law School

Date Written: August 9, 2017

Abstract

Insider trading law is meant to be a shield, protecting the market and investors from connected traders, but it can also be a sword. Insofar as we penalize trading on the basis of material non-public information, it becomes possible to share information strategically in order to disable or constrain innocent investors. A hostile takeover can be averted, or a bidding war curtailed, because information recipients must then refrain from trading. This Article offers the first general account of “insider tainting,” an increasingly pervasive phenomenon of weaponizing insider trading law.

Keywords: Insider Trading, Wolf Packs, Activist Hedge Funds, Mergers and Acquisitions, Mark Cuban, Securities Regulation, Hostile Takeovers, Japan

Suggested Citation

Verstein, Andrew, Insider Tainting: Strategic Tipping of Material Non-Public Information (August 9, 2017). Northwestern University Law Review, Forthcoming; Wake Forest Univ. Legal Studies Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3015757

Andrew Verstein (Contact Author)

Wake Forest University School of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 7206
Winston-Salem, NC 27109
United States
3367585433 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://law.wfu.edu/faculty/profile/verstea/

University of Chicago Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
222
Rank
117,306
Abstract Views
822