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When Antitrust Becomes Pro-Trust: The Digital Deformation of U.S. Competition Policy

7 Pages Posted: 16 Aug 2017  

Frank A. Pasquale III

University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; Yale University - Yale Information Society Project

Date Written: August 16, 2017

Abstract

U.S. antitrust authorities soberly acknowledge that the centripetal accumulation of data, money and power at massive technology firms is likely to be indefinite without government action. However, they are doing very little about the problem, citing legal doctrine and economic analysis that blesses digital platforms' abusive practices as the culmination of market rationality. That quiescence is based on several misconceptions about platforms, consumers, and markets.

Contemporary scholarship on competition in digital industries is far more sophisticated than the approaches now commonly adopted at the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Competition and the Antitrust Division at the Department of Justice. To remain relevant in an era when international authorities are at the cutting edge of competition enforcement, these agencies will need to acquaint themselves with cutting edge research. This essay offers a brief introduction to that work.

Keywords: antitrust, competition policy, digital platforms, Apple, Google, monopoly, disruption, Taylorism,

Suggested Citation

Pasquale, Frank A., When Antitrust Becomes Pro-Trust: The Digital Deformation of U.S. Competition Policy (August 16, 2017). CPI Antitrust Chronicle, May 2017; U of Maryland Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2017-24. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3020163

Frank A. Pasquale III (Contact Author)

University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law ( email )

500 West Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21201-1786
United States
410-706-4820 (Phone)
410-706-0407 (Fax)

Yale University - Yale Information Society Project ( email )

127 Wall Street
New Haven, CT 06511
United States

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