Regulatory Spillovers in Common Audit Markets
62 Pages Posted: 19 Aug 2017 Last revised: 6 Feb 2018
Date Written: February 5, 2018
We find that Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) had two significant effects on the audit market for nonpublic entities. The first short run effect stems from inelastic labor supply coupled with an increase in audit demand from public companies. As a result, private companies reduced their use of at-tested financial reports in bank financing by 12%, and audit fee increases for nonprofit organizations (NPOs) more than doubled. The second long run effect was a transformation in the audit supply structure. After SOX, NPOs were less likely to match with auditors most exposed to public companies, while auditors increasingly specialized their offices based on client type. Audit market concentration for NPOs dropped by more than half within five years of SOX and remained at this level through the end of our sample in 2013, while the number of suppliers in-creased by 26%. Our results demonstrate how regulation directed at public firms causes spillovers to nonpublic entities.
Keywords: Sarbanes-Oxley, securities regulation, auditing, market structure, accounting, private firms, non-profits, labor economics
JEL Classification: H83, M12, M21, M41, M48, M49
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation