Equity Crowdfunding in Germany and the UK: Follow-Up Funding and Firm Failure

In: Corporate Governance: An International Review, Special Issue, 2018, pp. 331-354

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6642

Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 17-09

41 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2017 Last revised: 7 Aug 2019

See all articles by Lars Hornuf

Lars Hornuf

Dresden University of Technology

Matthias Schmitt

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Eliza Stenzhorn

University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics

Date Written: January 30, 2018

Abstract

Today, startups often obtain financing via the Internet through many small contributions of non-sophisticated investors. Yet little is known about whether these startups can ultimately build enduring businesses. In this article, we hand-collected data from 14 different equity crowdfunding (ECF) portals and 426 firms that ran at least one successful ECF campaign in Germany or the United Kingdom. We empirically analyze different factors affecting follow-up funding and firm failure. The findings show that German firms that received ECF stood a higher chance of obtaining follow-up funding through business angels or venture capitalists, but also had a higher likelihood of failure. The number of senior managers, subsequent successful ECF campaigns, and the number of venture capital investors all had a positive impact on obtaining post-campaign financing, while firm age had a negative impact. Subsequent successful ECF campaigns were significant predictors decreasing firm failure.

Keywords: Equity Crowdfunding; Follow-Up Funding; Firm Survival

JEL Classification: G24; M13

Suggested Citation

Hornuf, Lars and Schmitt, Matthias and Stenzhorn, Eliza, Equity Crowdfunding in Germany and the UK: Follow-Up Funding and Firm Failure (January 30, 2018). In: Corporate Governance: An International Review, Special Issue, 2018, pp. 331-354, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6642, Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 17-09, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3020820 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3020820

Lars Hornuf

Dresden University of Technology ( email )

Dresden, 01307
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.hornuf.com

Matthias Schmitt (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.ip.mpg.de

Eliza Stenzhorn

University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics ( email )

Bremen, D-28359
Germany

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