Does Managerial Reporting Still Matter? An Experimental Investigation of Laboratory Hierarchies

39 Pages Posted: 19 Aug 2017 Last revised: 14 Jul 2019

See all articles by Farah Arshad

Farah Arshad

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management

Bart Dierynck

Tilburg University

Victor van Pelt

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Date Written: July 7, 2019

Abstract

Over the past several decades, technological advancements in information technology and data science have increasingly enabled firms to produce and distribute information, which challenges long-standing ideas about the role of managerial reporting in firms. We design a series of laboratory hierarchies to examine whether granting reporting responsibility to managers has a purpose beyond eliciting information from managers. Using three experimental treatments, we disentangle the different effects produced by managers' reporting choices, and we establish that granting managers responsibility for reporting may have a purpose beyond the elicitation and distribution of information managers possess. We discuss the implications of our findings for managerial reporting research and practice.

Keywords: multilateral agreements, hierarchy, reporting, disclosure, management, reputation, trust, information asymmetry, hold-up problem

JEL Classification: C92, D91, M40, M41

Suggested Citation

Arshad, Farah and Dierynck, Bart and van Pelt, Victor, Does Managerial Reporting Still Matter? An Experimental Investigation of Laboratory Hierarchies (July 7, 2019). AAA 2018 Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3021361 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3021361

Farah Arshad

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Bart Dierynck

Tilburg University ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC Noord-Brabant 5000 LE
Netherlands

Victor Van Pelt (Contact Author)

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )

Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany

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