Facing a Calibration Committee: The Impact on Costly Information Collection and Subjective Performance Evaluation

46 Pages Posted: 19 Aug 2017 Last revised: 10 Nov 2018

See all articles by Farah Arshad

Farah Arshad

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management

Eddy Cardinaels

KU Leuven; Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management

Bart Dierynck

Tilburg University

Date Written: November 9, 2018

Abstract

Recently, many organizations have installed calibration committees to review and correct subjective performance evaluations of supervisors about their employees. This study uses an experimental setting to examine the impact of calibration committees on supervisor evaluation behavior. We predict and find that a calibration committee instigates supervisors to collect additional costly information that helps to better explain the performance of their employees. We also find that the presence of a calibration committee leads to better differentiated performance evaluations through supervisors’ collection of additional costly information. We also study two different types of calibration committees; those consisting of only supervisors compared to those with both supervisors and a third party in the form of a HR-manager. Our results reveal that the presence of a third party (i.e. HR-manager) in the calibration committee leads to better information transfer during discussion in the calibration committee such that supervisors are more likely to consider other supervisors’ information about employees to reach a consensus about their evaluations. Our study opens the black box of calibration committees by eliciting behavioral mechanisms that instigate supervisors to make more thorough evaluations.

Keywords: Calibration committees, Subjectivity, Information collection, Information transfer, Differentiated performance evaluations

JEL Classification: M40, M41

Suggested Citation

Arshad, Farah and Cardinaels, Eddy and Dierynck, Bart, Facing a Calibration Committee: The Impact on Costly Information Collection and Subjective Performance Evaluation (November 9, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3021683 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3021683

Farah Arshad (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Eddy Cardinaels

KU Leuven ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium
+32 16326984 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.kuleuven.be/wieiswie/nl/person/00013472

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 134668231 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/webwijs/show/?uid=e.cardinaels

Bart Dierynck

Tilburg University ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC Noord-Brabant 5000 LE
Netherlands

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
499
Abstract Views
1,480
rank
58,820
PlumX Metrics