Constitutional Limits to the EU Agencies’ External Relations

TARN Working Paper Series 11/2017, August 2017

22 Pages Posted: 5 Sep 2017

See all articles by Merijn Chamon

Merijn Chamon

Ghent University-Universiteit Gent

Valerie Demedts

Ghent University-Universiteit Gent, Faculty of Law

Date Written: August 31, 2017

Abstract

The present working paper traces the constitutional limits to the external action of EU agencies. The paper argues that these limits are a combination of the general constitutional limits on EU action, the institutional balance in EU external relations (as most recently clarified by the Court of Justice in Case C-660/13) and the specific limits to EU agency action (the Meroni doctrine and the Common Approach on decentralised agencies). The paper further finds that the EU legislature has devoted insufficient attention to these limits when defining the agencies' external powers in their establishing regulations. The paper identifies a possible way forward to ensure effective external action by EU agencies while respecting the relevant constitutional limits.

Keywords: Constitutional limits, EU agencies, external action, institutional balance

Suggested Citation

Chamon, Merijn and Demedts, Valerie, Constitutional Limits to the EU Agencies’ External Relations (August 31, 2017). TARN Working Paper Series 11/2017, August 2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3021733 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3021733

Merijn Chamon (Contact Author)

Ghent University-Universiteit Gent ( email )

Universiteitstraat 4
Gent, 9000
Belgium

Valerie Demedts

Ghent University-Universiteit Gent, Faculty of Law ( email )

Universiteitstraat 4
Ghent
Belgium

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