Working Longer but Not Harder: The Effects of Incentivizing Inputs versus Outputs in a Heterogeneous Workforce

Posted: 19 Aug 2017 Last revised: 11 Jun 2020

See all articles by Eric W. Chan

Eric W. Chan

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Accounting

Steven J. Kachelmeier

University of Texas at Austin

Xinyu Zhang

Cornell SC Johnson College of Business

Date Written: June 10, 2020

Abstract

To address the empirical phenomenon that organizations often reward time on the job as an end in itself, we design an experiment in which participants solve anagram puzzles, manipulating whether a compensation pool generated from the output of paired workers is allocated based on the individual inputs of relative time spent or on the individual outputs of puzzles solved. Relative to an output-based allocation, we find that an input based allocation leads participants to spend more time on the task. However, when paired participants have widely different abilities, an input-based allocation also leads to less effort intensity, defined as puzzles solved per unit of time spent. We attribute these findings to fairness considerations, an interpretation we corroborate in a second experiment with purely individual incentives that finds the same effort duration advantage of input-based pay but no offsetting disadvantage in effort intensity.

Keywords: Compensation, pay allocations, inputs and outputs, relative abilities, experimental economics.

JEL Classification: D91, J33, M40

Suggested Citation

Chan, Eric W. and Kachelmeier, Steven J. and Zhang, Xinyu, Working Longer but Not Harder: The Effects of Incentivizing Inputs versus Outputs in a Heterogeneous Workforce (June 10, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3022360 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3022360

Eric W. Chan

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Accounting ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States

Steven J. Kachelmeier (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin ( email )

Department of Accounting
2110 Speedway, Mail Stop B6400
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-471-3517 (Phone)
512-471-3904 (Fax)

Xinyu Zhang

Cornell SC Johnson College of Business ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14850
United States

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