Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm Value

46 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2002

See all articles by Benjamin Maury

Benjamin Maury

Hanken School of Economics

Anete Pajuste

Stockholm School of Economics, Riga; European Gorporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 24, 2004


We present a model of the effects of having multiple large shareholders on the valuation of firms. Using a sample of Finnish listed firms over the period from 1993 to 2000, we show, consistent with the model, that a more equal distribution of the votes among large blockholders has a positive effect on firm value. This result is particularly strong in family-controlled firms suggesting that families (which typically have managerial or board representation) are more prone to private benefit extraction if they are not monitored by another strong blockholder. We also show that the relation between multiple blockholders and firm value significantly depends on the identity of these blockholders.

Keywords: Corporate governance, Ownership structure, Multiple blockholders, Firm value

JEL Classification: G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Maury, Benjamin and Pajuste, Anete, Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm Value (March 24, 2004). Available at SSRN: or

Benjamin Maury

Hanken School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 479
FI-00101 Helsinki, 00101

Anete Pajuste (Contact Author)

Stockholm School of Economics, Riga ( email )

Strelnieku iela 4a
Riga, LV 1010

European Gorporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels

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