Migration-Induced Redistribution with and Without Migrant's Voting

18 Pages Posted: 21 Aug 2017

See all articles by Assaf Razin

Assaf Razin

Tel Aviv University

Efraim Sadka

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: August 2017

Abstract

We are motivated by the unique migration experience of Israel of a supply-side shock triggering skilled immigration and the concurrent decline in welfare-state redistribution. This paper develops a model, which can provide an explanation for the mechanism through which a supply-side shock triggering high-skill migration can also reshape the political-economy balance and the redistributive policies. The paper highlights the differences in the political-economy induced redistribution policies between the cases in which migrants participate in the electoral system and the case where they do not. When migrants are allowed to vote, and they take advantage of this right, then, following the shock, all income groups gain, except low skilled immigrants who lose. When migrants are not allowed to vote, or choose not to participate in elections, all income groups gain, except the skilled migrants who lose.

Suggested Citation

Razin, Assaf and Sadka, Efraim, Migration-Induced Redistribution with and Without Migrant's Voting (August 2017). NBER Working Paper No. w23713. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3023111

Assaf Razin (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University ( email )

Efraim Sadka

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
+972 3 640 9712 (Phone)
+972 3 642 8074 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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