What Explains Taxation by Resource-Rich Rebels? Evidence from the Islamic State in Syria

Journal of Politics, 2020, Forthcoming

56 Pages Posted: 25 Aug 2017 Last revised: 3 Feb 2019

Date Written: January 20, 2019


Greed-based theories of civil war predict that rebel groups will only engage in taxation and other state- building activities in areas where they lack exploitable resources. However, this prediction is contradicted by the Islamic State’s pattern of taxation across time and space. A new dataset mapping seven types of revenue-extracting policies imposed by the Islamic State, a jihadist rebel group, in the 19 Syrian districts that it governed between 2013 and 2017 indicates that these policies were just as prevalent in resource-rich as in resource-poor districts. I propose a new theory that better explains this pattern — a rebel group’s pattern of taxation is codetermined by (1) ideology and (2) the costs of warfare — and establish the plausibility of this theory through a case study of al-Mayadin, the most oil-rich district governed by the Islamic State and therefore an ideal site in which to investigate the puzzle of taxation by resource-rich rebels.

Keywords: rebel governance, state formation, civil war, Syria, Islamic State

Suggested Citation

Revkin, Mara Redlich, What Explains Taxation by Resource-Rich Rebels? Evidence from the Islamic State in Syria (January 20, 2019). Journal of Politics, 2020, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3023317 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3023317

Mara Redlich Revkin (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

HOME PAGE: http://law.duke.edu/fac/revkin/

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