The Influence of Managerial Ownership on the Real Gains in Corporate Mergers and Market Revaluation of Merger Partners: Empirical Evidence

43 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2002

See all articles by Nicholas F. Carline

Nicholas F. Carline

Department of Finance, Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham

Scott C. Linn

University of Oklahoma - Michael F. Price College of Business

Pradeep K. Yadav

University of Oklahoma Price College of Business

Abstract

This study empirically examines the impact of firm-specific and deal-specific factors on the change in industry-adjusted operating performance around corporate mergers and acquisitions. The factors investigated are offer size, bidder leverage, the size of bidder's cash resources, whether the bidder's and target's businesses are in the same industrial category, the method of payment selected for the merger, whether the merger was friendly or hostile, different aspects of the bidder's ownership structure, and different aspects of the bidder's governance arrangements. Most of these factors are being examined for the first time in this context. The empirical analysis is based on UK firms merging between 1985 and 1994, and hence the paper also reports on real gains in corporate mergers for a sample of mergers outside the U.S. Utilizing single equation models, our results indicate that the performance of merged firms improves significantly following their combination. However, the extent of improvement depends significantly on the method of payment selected for the merger, and whether the merger was friendly or hostile. Performance change is also shown to be related to director and officer ownership as well as the concentration of ownership in the hands of outside blockholders.

Keywords: Mergers, Operating Performance

JEL Classification: G35, C51

Suggested Citation

Carline, Nicholas F. and Linn, Scott C. and Yadav, Pradeep K., The Influence of Managerial Ownership on the Real Gains in Corporate Mergers and Market Revaluation of Merger Partners: Empirical Evidence. EFA 2002 Berlin Meetings Discussion Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=302606 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.302606

Nicholas F. Carline

Department of Finance, Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham ( email )

Edgbaston Park Road
Birmingham, B15 2TY
United Kingdom

Scott C. Linn (Contact Author)

University of Oklahoma - Michael F. Price College of Business ( email )

307 West Brooks
Norman, OK 73019-4004
United States
405-325-3444 (Phone)
405-325-1957 (Fax)

Pradeep K. Yadav

University of Oklahoma Price College of Business ( email )

307 W.Brooks, Room 205A Division of Finance
Norman, OK 73019
United States
4053256640 (Phone)
4053255491 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ou.edu/price/finance/faculty/pradeep_yadav.html

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
870
Abstract Views
3,191
rank
26,720
PlumX Metrics