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National Tax Regulation, International Standards and the GATS: Argentina—Financial Services

28 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2017  

Panagiotis Delimatsis

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Tilburg Law School

Bernard Hoekman

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Date Written: August 17, 2017

Abstract

Can a WTO Member discriminate against foreign suppliers of services located in jurisdictions that refuse to share information with a government to permit it to determine if its nationals engage in tax evasion? Does it matter if the Member uses standards developed by an international body as the criterion for deciding whether to impose measures? In Argentina—Financial Services the WTO Appellate Body held that services from jurisdictions that share financial tax information may be different from services provided by jurisdictions that do not cooperate in supplying such information. It overruled a Panel finding that measures to increase taxes on financial transactions with non-cooperative jurisdictions were discriminatory. We argue that the AB reached to the right conclusion on the basis of the wrong arguments; that it missed an important opportunity to clarify what WTO Members are permitted to do to enforce their domestic regulatory regimes; and increased the scope for confusion and future litigation by considering that the likeness of services and service suppliers may be a function of prevailing domestic regulatory regimes.

Keywords: tax evasion; tax havens; international regulatory cooperation; information exchange, transparency

JEL Classification: F38, F51, G28, H26, H87

Suggested Citation

Delimatsis, Panagiotis and Hoekman, Bernard, National Tax Regulation, International Standards and the GATS: Argentina—Financial Services (August 17, 2017). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2017-033. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3026094

Panagiotis Delimatsis (Contact Author)

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Postbus 90153
Tilburg, NL-5000 LE
Netherlands
0031 13 466 8251 (Phone)
0031 13 466 8047 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/webwijs/show/?uid=p.delimatsis

Tilburg Law School ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Postbus 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Bernard Hoekman

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies ( email )

Fiesole, Tuscany
Italy

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

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