Can Europe Run Greece? Lessons from U.S. Fiscal Receiverships in Latin America, 1904-31

35 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2017

See all articles by Noel Maurer

Noel Maurer

George Washington University

Leticia Arroyo Abad

CUNY - Queens College

Date Written: June 13, 2017

Abstract

In 2012 and again in 2015, the German government proposed sending German administrators to manage Greece’s tax and privatization authorities. The idea was that shared governance would reduce corruption and root out inefficient practices. (In 2017 the Boston Globe proposed a similar arrangement for Haiti.) We test a version of shared governance using eight U.S. interventions between 1904 and 1931, under which American officials took over management of Latin American fiscal institutions. We develop a stylized model in which better monitoring by incorruptible managers does not lead to higher government revenues. Using a new panel of data on fiscal revenues and the volume and terms of trade, we find that revenue fell under receiverships. Our results hold under instrumental variables estimation and with counterfactual specifications using synthetic controls.

Keywords: Institutions

JEL Classification: N46, O43

Suggested Citation

Maurer, Noel and Arroyo Abad, Leticia, Can Europe Run Greece? Lessons from U.S. Fiscal Receiverships in Latin America, 1904-31 (June 13, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3026330 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3026330

Noel Maurer (Contact Author)

George Washington University ( email )

2121 I Street NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States

Leticia Arroyo Abad

CUNY - Queens College ( email )

65-30 Kissena Blvd
Flushing, NY 11367-1597
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
34
Abstract Views
518
PlumX Metrics