Information Transmission and Ownership Consolidation in Aid Programs

18 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2017

See all articles by Axel Dreher

Axel Dreher

Heidelberg University

Sarah Langlotz

Heidelberg University

Silvia Marchesi

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS); Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS); University of Milan - Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano (LdA) ; Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for European Studies (CefES)

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Date Written: October 2017

Abstract

We investigate the degree of leeway donors of foreign aid should grant to recipient governments when their preferences over how to implement the aid are different, and both the donor and recipient possess some private information about the most effective policies. Intuitively, our model shows that donors should stay in control of how their aid is spent when their own private information is more important than the private information of the recipient. Less obviously, an increase in the difference of preferences between donors and recipients can increase rather than decrease the leeway that donors should grant the recipients, as the recipients' information gains in importance relative to those of the donors, and recipients become less likely to communicate truthfully. We test the model using dyadic data for 28 bilateral aid donors and 112 recipients, over the 1995–2010 period. Our proxy for “centralized” aid is project aid, while budget aid leaves more leeway to the recipient and thus proxies for “decentralized” aid. In line with the model, misaligned interests and informational asymmetries indeed influence the shares of aid given as budget and project aid.

JEL Classification: C23, D82, F33, O1

Suggested Citation

Dreher, Axel and Langlotz, Sarah and Marchesi, Silvia, Information Transmission and Ownership Consolidation in Aid Programs (October 2017). Economic Inquiry, Vol. 55, Issue 4, pp. 1671-1688, 2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3026749 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12450

Axel Dreher (Contact Author)

Heidelberg University ( email )

Grabengasse 1
Heidelberg, 69117
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.axel-dreher.de

Sarah Langlotz

Heidelberg University ( email )

Grabengasse 1
Heidelberg, 69117
Germany

Silvia Marchesi

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milano, 20126
Italy
+39 02 64483057 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/ssilviamarchesi/home

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milano, 20126
Italy

University of Milan - Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano (LdA)

Via P. Amedeo 34
Milano, Mi 20122
Italy

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for European Studies (CefES)

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