Regulating Fintech

60 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2017 Last revised: 25 Jun 2018

William J. Magnuson

Texas A&M University School of Law

Date Written: August 26, 2017

Abstract

The financial crisis of 2008 has led to dramatic changes in the way that finance is regulated: the Dodd-Frank Act imposed broad and systemic regulation on the industry on a level not seen since the New Deal. But the financial regulatory reforms enacted since the crisis have been premised on an outdated idea of what financial services look like and how they are provided. Regulation has failed to take into account the rise of financial technology (or “fintech”) firms and the fundamental changes they have ushered in on a variety of fronts, from the way that banking works, to the way that capital is raised, even to the very form of money itself. These changes call for a wide-ranging reconceptualization of financial regulation in an era of technology-enabled finance. In particular, this Article argues that regulators’ focus on preventing the risks associated with “too big to fail” institutions overlooks the conceptually distinct risks associated with small, decentralized financial markets. In many ways, these risks can be greater than those presented by large institutions because decentralized fintech markets are more vulnerable to adverse economic shocks, are less transparent to regulators, and are more likely to encourage excessively risky behavior by market participants. The Article concludes by sketching out a variety of regulatory responses that better correspond to fintech’s particular risks and rewards.

Keywords: fintech, financial regulation, technology, corporate law

Suggested Citation

Magnuson, William J., Regulating Fintech (August 26, 2017). Vanderbilt Law Review, Forthcoming; Texas A&M University School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17-55. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3027525

William J. Magnuson (Contact Author)

Texas A&M University School of Law ( email )

1515 Commerce St.
Fort Worth, TX 76102
United States

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