'Deliberative Supranationalism' - a Defence

European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 5, No. 8, July 4, 2001

18 Pages Posted: 13 Mar 2002

See all articles by Christian Joerges

Christian Joerges

University of Bremen - Faculty of Law; Hertie School of Governance

Abstract

This paper is essentially a translation of a comment in German (Joerges 2000) on a series of articles in which Rainer Schmalz-Bruns (1998, 1999a, 1999b) developed a concept of legitimate governance beyond the constitutional state, which he called "deliberative supra-nationalism" and contrasted with what Jurgen Neyer and the present author had suggested under the same title (Joerges/Neyer 1997). Our querelles allemandes were not specifically Teutonic: while Schmalz-Bruns presented his approach as a systematic elaboration of the theories of deliberative democracy, based, in particular, on recent contributions by Joshua Cohen, Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel (Cohen/Sabel, 1997; Dorf/Sabel 1998), Jurgen Neyer and I had offered an interpretation of institutional innovations and decision-making practices as observed in the European market-building project. This discussion has had precursors and follow-ups in various contexts, among both lawyers and political scientists. This essay should hence be understood as contribution to an ongoing debate.

Keywords: European integration, comitology, democratization, European Agencies, expert committees, governance, legitimacy, multilevel governance, non-majoritarian institutions, risk regulation, supranationalism, political science, law

Suggested Citation

Joerges, Christian, 'Deliberative Supranationalism' - a Defence. European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 5, No. 8, July 4, 2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=302782 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.302782

Christian Joerges (Contact Author)

University of Bremen - Faculty of Law ( email )

PO Box 330440
Bremen, 28334
Germany

Hertie School of Governance ( email )

Friedrichstra├če 180
Berlin, 10117
Germany

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