Download This PaperAbuse of Power – An Experimental Investigation of the Effects of Power and Transparency on Centralized Punishment
26 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2017
Date Written: August 2017
Abstract
We investigate power abuse of a single punisher in a public-goods-game subject to variations in punishment power and contribution transparency. We find a high amount of abuse across all conditions. More power led to more abuse over time, while transparency could only curb abuse in the high power conditions. These findings highlight the dangers of power centralization, but suggest a more complex relation of power and transparency.
Keywords: Punishment, Public-Goods-Game, Designated Punishment, Abuse, Transparency, Power
JEL Classification: H41, C92, K42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Hoeft, Leonard and Mill, Wladislaw, Abuse of Power – An Experimental Investigation of the Effects of Power and Transparency on Centralized Punishment (August 2017). MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2017/15, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3027981 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3027981
Leonard Hoeft (Contact Author)
Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )
Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany
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