Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility

22 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2017 Last revised: 2 Jan 2018

See all articles by Ravi Jagadeesan

Ravi Jagadeesan

Harvard University- Department of Mathematics

Scott Duke Kominers

Harvard University

Ross Rheingans-Yoo

Harvard University

Date Written: December 23, 2017

Abstract

We give a direct proof of one-sided strategy-proofness for worker-firm matching under continuously transferable utility. A new “Lone Wolf” theorem (Jagadeesan et al. (2017)) for settings with transferable utility allows us to adapt the method of proving one-sided strategy-proofness that is typically used in settings with discrete transfers.

Keywords: Matching, Strategy-proofness, Lone Wolf Theorem, Rural Hospitals Theorem, Mechanism design

JEL Classification: C78, D44, D47, D82

Suggested Citation

Jagadeesan, Ravi and Kominers, Scott Duke and Rheingans-Yoo, Ross, Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility (December 23, 2017). Harvard Business School Entrepreneurial Management Working Paper No. 18-016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3028004 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3028004

Ravi Jagadeesan

Harvard University- Department of Mathematics ( email )

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Scott Duke Kominers (Contact Author)

Harvard University ( email )

Rock Center
Harvard Business School
Boston, MA 02163
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.scottkom.com/

Ross Rheingans-Yoo

Harvard University ( email )

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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