Liberty, Equality, Bribery, and Self-Government: Reframing the Campaign Finance Debate

Democracy by the People: Reforming Campaign Finance in America (Kuhner & Mazo eds., Cambridge UP, 2018, Forthcoming)

Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2017-47

15 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2017 Last revised: 31 Oct 2017

See all articles by Deborah Hellman

Deborah Hellman

University of Virginia School of Law

Date Written: August 1, 2017

Abstract

Campaign finance law is often framed as a tension between liberty and equality. On one side is the freedom of speech, which the Supreme Court has interpreted to include the freedom to give and spend money in connection with elections. On the other is democratic equality and the idea that we are each entitled to an equal voice in choosing our representatives. If this is the tension that underlies the current jurisprudence, it would appear that liberty has won out and equality has been vanquished.

But appearances can be deceiving. This facile contrast between liberty and equality overstates both what the relevant cases have held, and it ignores the ways in which different understandings of these values are present in other aspects of our constitutional jurisprudence. This chapter argues that the constitutional doctrine relevant to assessing campaign finance cases includes the equality-based doctrines governing political participation and the liberty-based commitment to self-government.

Suggested Citation

Hellman, Deborah, Liberty, Equality, Bribery, and Self-Government: Reframing the Campaign Finance Debate (August 1, 2017). Democracy by the People: Reforming Campaign Finance in America (Kuhner & Mazo eds., Cambridge UP, 2018, Forthcoming), Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2017-47, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3028102

Deborah Hellman (Contact Author)

University of Virginia School of Law ( email )

580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States

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