Justice for Sale: Political Crises and Legal Development

Simpson, Hannah. 2020. "Justice for Sale: Political Crises and Legal Development."

38 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2017 Last revised: 26 May 2020

See all articles by Hannah Simpson

Hannah Simpson

Texas A&M University, Department of Politics

Date Written: September 14, 2017

Abstract

Political security is often viewed as a necessary precondition for rulers to develop property- protecting legal institutions. I argue that because these institutions can build political support and generate revenue, domestically insecure rulers may also invest in them. I test this argument using newly collected 12th-century data on the operation of the nascent English common law system. Leveraging the 1192 shipwreck and subsequent kidnap of Richard I as an exogenous shock to domestic political security, I find that the catastrophe appears to have prompted the English Royal Court’s short-term deployment to raise political support in areas vulnerable to rebellion. I present suggestive evidence that this effect in vulnerable areas persisted into the medium-term, and appears to have expanded to the rest of the country. Drawing on this and other evidence of changes in Royal Court funding, activity, and organization between 1184 and 1203, I argue that the shock may have helped to bring about a permanent increase in the Court’s capacity and accessibility. These findings are relevant to studies of the common law and the political economy of legal institutions generally.

Keywords: political economy, political science, institutional development, legal capacity, legal institutions, law and politics, history and politics, quantitative methods

Suggested Citation

Simpson, Hannah, Justice for Sale: Political Crises and Legal Development (September 14, 2017). Simpson, Hannah. 2020. "Justice for Sale: Political Crises and Legal Development." , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3028175 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3028175

Hannah Simpson (Contact Author)

Texas A&M University, Department of Politics ( email )

TX
United States

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